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THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARTICLES 1-3 OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION ACCORDING
TO THE NORTH SEA CASES
MYRON NORDQUIST*
The United States Government submitted a Draft Convention
on the International Sea-Bed Area at the August 1970 meeting
of the United Nations Committee on the Deep Sea-Bed.' The
Draft Convention reflected a dramatic policy decision by President
Nixon and translated into action his belief that the "stark fact is
that the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of modern
technology and the concerns of the international community."2
This initiative by the United States presented the Sea-Beds
Committee with concrete treaty terms and certainly added sub-
stantial impetus towards convening a new law of the sea conference
in the near future. At the same time, it raised a number of impor-
tant issues, among them the relationship between certain provi-
sions in the Draft Convention and Articles 1-3 of the 1958 Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf.3 For example, Article 2 of the
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1. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Twenty-Fifth Session,
Supplement No. 21, document A/8021, Annex V at 130-176.
2. Statement by the President on U.S. Oceans Policy, White House
Press Release, May 23, 1970.
3. The complete text of the Continental Shelf Convention is contained in
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55, T.I.A.S. 5578 and 15 U.S.T. 471. Articles 1-3
read as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adja-
cent to the coasts of islands.
Article 2
1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclu-
sive in the sense that if the coastal state does not explore the con-
tinental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake
these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the
express consent of the coastal state.
3. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
1
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United States working draft would preclude State claims of sov-
ereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the sea-bed area or its
resources beyond the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of
continents and islands. In addition, each Contracting Party would
agree not to recognize any such claim or exercise of sovereignty
or sovereign rights. The rights, titles, or interests in the Inter-
national Sea-Bed Area or its resources would be defined and ac-
quired through provisions in the Convention.4
One effect if the United States Draft were accepted would be
to inhibit claims to the Continental Shelf which might be based
on the much criticized "exploitability criterion" contained in Ar-
ticle 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. As a practical mat-
ter, the United States proposal was quite timely in that, as of late
1970, no State had apparently claimed to have perfected sovereign
rights over the natural resources located beyond 200 meters un-
der the exploitability clause of Article 1.1
Insofar as legal theory is concerned, the effect of adopting the
Draft Convention (or one with similar terms) on existing custo-
depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclama-
tion.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the
mineral and other non-living organisms which, at the harvestable stage,
either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move ex-
cept in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
Article 3
The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that
of the airspace above those waters.
4. The United States delegation was aware of the potential conflict be-
tween Draft provisions and the Continental Shelf Convention. The following note
was inserted after Article 2 of the Draft Convention:
The preceding Article is not intended to imply that States do not cur-
rently have rights under, or consistent with, the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf.
5. However, time may be running short. Global Marine, Inc., has re-
cently announced the development of an advanced drill hole re-entry system.
This is a major technological breakthrough as drill bits can now be replaced
even where the water is several miles deep. Many experts believe there are
more economic roadblocks confronting deep sea petroleum extraction than there
are technological problems. From a legal perspective, opinions are divided over
whether "admits of exploitation" in Article 1 of the Convention might require
petroleum wells merely to be technologically possible or actually to be commer-
cially feasible before Continental Shelf rights might be acquired under the Con-
vention. Presumably some tangible manifestation of production capacity would
be expected. Deepsea Ventures, Inc., successfully mined manganese nodules in
2,500 feet of water on the Blake Plateau about 200 miles off the coast of Flor-
ida in August 1970. This project was "scientific" exploration but commercial
operations are contemplated before 1975 according to the president of the
company.
1970
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mary law of the Continental Shelf is not clear. Obviously, the
specific terms of the Convention as finally agreed, would be cru-
cial to such a comparative examination. And the precise termi-
nology in question will not be known until the signatory States
have reached agreement at an up-coming law of the sea or sea-bed
conference. In that regard, the comprehensive Draft Convention
proposed by the United States will undoubtedly provide an excel-
lent basis for initiating negotiations.
At this point in time, however, the current legal status of
Articles 1-3 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf can be examined without reference to the terms of any fu-
ture law of the sea or sea-bed treaty. Therefore, this inquiry will
focus on the relevant opinions expressed on this subject in the most
authoritative forum on the legal standing of international rules-
The International Court of Justice. But as judicial expressions
should be evaluated in context, it will be necessary first to review
the only decision of the Court which directly bears on the ques-
tion of the customary law status of Articles 1-3.
THE JUDGMENT IN THE NORTH SEA
CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES
A number of significant insights relating to the overall legal
status of the Continental Shelf were enunciated in the judgment
delivered by the International Court of Justice on February 20,
1969.6 The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases were primarily
concerned with the delimitation of continental shelf areas among
coastal States bordering the North Sea. The dispute existed be-
tween the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark on the one
hand, and between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Netherlands on the other. By request of the Parties the Court
joined the two proceedings, though the cases remained separate
in the sense that they related to different areas under the North
Sea.7  The Parties agreed that, for the purpose of appointing a
6. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969 [herein-
after cited as [1969] I.C.J.]. It should be kept in mind from the outset that
the entire North Sea area in question was overlain by waters less than 200
meters deep.
7. Id. para. 11. The legal arguments for Denmark and the Netherlands
were nearly identical. In retrospect, Denmark may have fared badly from the
joinder in that Denmark's equitable position was much stronger than the Nether-
lands'. See 2 I.C.J. Pleadings, North Sea Continental Shelf, 270-278 [herein-
after cited as Pleadings].
Vol. I
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Judge ad hoc, the Governments of Denmark and the Netherlands
were in the same interest.
8
The Parties undertook to carry out delimitations in the dis-
puted shelf areas according to the court's decision on the following
question:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable
to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the
continental shelf in the North Sea which appertains to each of
them beyond the partial boundary determined by the above
mentioned Convention of 9 June 1965? [Convention of 1
December 1964 in the case of Denmark.] 9
The Court was not asked to delimit the areas of continental
shelf appertaining to the respective Parties nor was it bound to
prescribe the methods or factors to be employed for such de-
limitation. The Court's task was to indicate the principles and
rules of law in the light of which the methods for eventually
effecting the delimitation would be chosen.10 In other words, the
Court was to provide general directions but not specific details, as
the final delimitation of the areas was expressly reserved by the
Parties for subsequent negotiations pursuant to the guidance in
the Court's decision."
By eleven votes to six,12 the Court held that the equidistance
method represented in Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion was not obligatory as between the Parties and that no other
single method of delimitation was to be used in all circumstances.
The applicable principles and rules of international law were de-
clared to be as follows:
8. Denmark and the Netherlands chose Dr. Max Sorensen to sit upon the
Bench pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. The Federal Republic selected Dr. Hermann Mosler as its
judge ad hoc.
9. [1969] I.C.J. 6.
10. Id. para. 84.
11. The Parties have since met on several occasions and it has been re-
ported that an agreement has been reached.
12. Judges voting for the majority were President J.L. Bustamante Y Rivero
(Separate Opinion at 58), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice Jessup (Individual Opinion
at 66), Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Declaration at 54), Padilla Nervo (Sep-
arate Opinion at 86), Forster, Gros, Ammoun (Separate Opinion at 101), Petreu,
Onyeama and Mosler.
Dissenting Judges included Vice President Koretsky (Dissenting Opinion at
155), Tanaka (Dissenting Opinion at 172), Morelli (Dissenting Opinion at
198), Bengzon (Declaration at 56), Lachs (Dissenting Opinion at 218) and
Sorensen (Dissenting Opinion at 242).
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(1) [D]elimitation is to be effected by agreement in accord-
ance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the
relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as
possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf
that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into
and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural pro-
longation of land territory of the other;
(2) if, in the application of the preceding subparagraph, the
delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are
to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, failing
agreements equally, unless they decide on a regime of joint
jurisdiction, user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or
any part of them .... 13
The Court outlined the factors to be taken into account in
the course of negotiations.14 The first factor was the general
configuration of the Parties' coasts with allowance for the presence
of any special or unusual features. 15 Secondly, the physical and
geological structure, and natural resources of the continental shelf
areas involved, insofar as ascertainable, were to be considered.
Thirdly, an equitable delimitation required a reasonable degree of
proportionality between the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast mea-
sured in the general direction of the shoreline, taking into account
other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the
same region. 16
The Court attempted to confine the decision to the facts at
hand which related to a context of Continental Shelf delimitation.' 7
At the same time, the Court expressly affirmed the general legal
regime of the continental shelf and explained ". . . it would not
be in harmony with this history [of the general legal regime] to
over-systematize a pragmatic construct the developments of which
13. [1969] I.C.J. 53.
14. id. at 55.
15. This factor was substantially in line with the West German contention
that their concave coast unjustly limited their share of the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf under the equidistance principle. It may also point towards the
type of result envisioned by the "special circumstances" exception in Article 6.
16. The Court thereby seemed to accept the West German argument that
its coastal front or extent of connection with the North Sea justified a higher
percentage of continental shelf sea-bed than equidistance methods permitted.
This was the crucial point which had stalled negotiations among the Parties
prior to submitting the case to the International Court.
17. [1969] I.C.J. 54.
Vol. 1
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have occurred within a relatively short space of time." '
The Federal Republic of Germany gained a decided advan-
tage by the outcome of the case. By rejecting the "equidistance-
special circumstances" method as a mandatory rule governing
the dispute, the Court undercut the foundation of the legal argu-
ments put forth on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands.
Squarely basing delimitation on agreement between the Parties in
accordance with "equitable principles" was equivalent in applica-
tion to acceptance of the West German's argument that the States
concerned were entitled to a "just and equitable share" of the
available continental shelf.19 However, the majority opinion made
it clear that the decision was reached using general principles of
law and was not decided ex aequo et bono.20 Further the Court
stated it was not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of
abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself required
the application of equitable principles. 21
Denmark and the Netherlands argued that Article 6 of the
1958 Continental Shelf Convention was binding on all the Parties
in the case. While the Federal Republic had never ratified the
Convention, it was contended that the West Germans were bound
by Article 6 because, by conduct, public statements and proclama-
tions, and in other ways, the Republic had assumed the obligations
of the Convention.
The Court concluded that only the existence of a situation of
estoppel could support the contentions advanced by Denmark and
the Netherlands. 22  The Court found that the Federal Republic's
18. Id. The Court's concern with "over-systematization" may partially ex-
plain its lack of specification as to the content of the "general regime" and as to
the exact legal status of Articles 1-3 of the Continental Shelf Convention.
19. But the Court was unable to accept the Federal Republic's argu-
ment, as presented, which urged that the continental shelf was to be "sliced up
like a pie." The court was bound by the Special Agreements submitting the case
which assigned the Court a function of delimiting boundaries not apportioning
areas. Moreover, while the end result would be the same in the case under
consideration, the pure notion of an equitable share was at variance with what
was found to be the fundamental concept of natural prolongation. This con-
cept did not encompass the idea of there being anything undivided to share out
as the area already must, by definition, appertain to one or other of the bor-
dering States. See Id. para. 20.
20. Id. para. 17.
21. Id. para. 85.
22. A legal argument based on estoppel, as such, was never advanced by
the representatives for Denmark and the Netherlands. The lack of an estoppel
argument per se could explain the Court's statement that there was "no evidence
1970
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past conduct had not evinced acceptance of the equidistance prin-
ciple in a manner which would have entitled Denmark and the
Netherlands reasonably to rely to their detriment or prejudice.
Denmark and the Netherlands also advanced the thesis that
the "equidistance-special circumstance" principle embodied in Ar-
ticle 6, was a rule of general or customary international law, au-
tomatically binding on the Federal Republic. Central to this ar-
gument was the notion of what the Court called "absolute proxim-
ity," i.e., a shelf area must appertain to the nearest coastal State.
The Court accepted the point that absolute proximity in the
sense of distance might be one important test to determine shelf
limits, but was not necessarily the most appropriate one in all
circumstances. What conferred ipso jure title was the fact that
the submarine areas might be deemed part of a State's territory in
the sense that the areas were a prolongation of the land territory
under the sea. The equidistance method was thus rejected as an
"inherent" rule in that it might cause areas which were the natural
prolongation of the territory of one State, to be attributed to an-
other state.
The question of whether or not the equidistance principle or
method might bind the West Germans by being a rule of custo-
mary international law brought about through positive law proc-
esses was also rejected by the Court. After a careful review of the
preparatory work of the International Law Commission, subse-
quent State practice and evidence concerning the general recog-
nition of legal compulsion behind Article 6, the Court concluded
that the Geneva Convention was not in its origins or inception de-
claratory of a mandatory rule of customary international law en-
joining the use of the equidistance method. Moreover, the sub-
sequent effect of Article 6 had not been constitutive of such a
customary rule and State practice to date had equally been insuf-
ficient for that purpose. Finally, the Court found no conclusive
evidence that any State had acted in compliance with equidistance
principles because it had felt compelled by a rule of customary
law to construct boundaries by that method. 23
whatever" presented by Denmark or the Netherlands of a detrimental change in
position in reliance on the Federal Republic's conduct. See Id. para. 30.
23. The Court seemed strongly influenced by the fact that Article 12 of
the Continental Shelf Convention permitted reservations to Article 6. The
Court reasoned that Article 6 could not reflect emergent or customary law if
reservations were permitted to a supposedly universally binding norm. It is
Vol. 1
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Once the obligatory nature of Article 6 was rejected there
was no necessity for the Court to consider whether or not the
concave configuration of the German North Sea coast constituted
a "special circumstance" within the meaning of Article 6 of the
Continental Shelf Convention. 4
OPINIONS IN THE NORTH SEA CASES ON
ARTICLES 1-3 OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF CONVENTION
The Majority Opinion
Having reviewed the Judgment in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, an appropriate stage has now been reached to turn to
the question of the status of Articles 1-3 of the Continental Shelf
Convention in relation to customary law; and to analyze the views
expressed on this topic both in the majority opinion and in the in-
dividual opinions. In so doing, it must be kept in mind that
each Judge's conclusion was based on an evaluation of the exist-
ing evidence of State practice found to have a bearing on the cus-
tomary law status of Articles 1-3.
The majority opinion referred to Articles 1-3 in the following
terms:
. . . Article 12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention,
. . . permits reservations to be made to all the articles of the
Convention other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive-these three
Articles being the ones which, it is clear, were then regarded as
reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent
rules of customary international law relative to the continental
shelf, amongst them the question of the seaward extent of the
shelf. The juridical character of the coastal State's entitle-
ment; the nature of the rights exerciseable; the kind of natural
resources to which these relate; and the preservation intact of
questionable whether or not this is a true effect assignable to the Article 12
reservation clause which may have been included to protect the more funda-
mental Articles 1-3, without indicating a legal opinion about Article 6's cus-
tomary law status.
24. A map on page 15 of the Judgment illustrates the geometric distortion
which results from the magnification of small coastal effects extended far out
to sea. The net effect in the case was to confer West German sovereign rights
over 23,600 square kilometers of sea-bed under the equidistance method and
possibly to sanction up to 36,700 square kilometers if the equidistance rule were
not applicable. The problem was accentuated because the disputed area was
thought to contain extensive oil and gas reserves. See Judge Jessup's Separate
Opinion at 66.
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the legal status as high seas of the waters over the shelf, and
the legal status of the superjacent air-space. 25
The Court's comparison of Article 6 with Articles 1-3 was
central to the crux of the Judgment-a rejection of Article 6's
status as customary international law. The Court stated in this
regard because
Article 6 ... was not, as were Articles 1 to 3, excluded from
the faculty of reservation, it is a legitimate inference that it was
considered to have a different and less fundamental status, and
not, like those Articles, to reflect pre-existing or emergent
customary law.26
It should be noted that the majority opinion does not un-
equivocally state that Articles 1-3 were either fully developed or
even emergent norms of customary law in 1958.27 But by con-
trasting the legal status of Articles 1-3 with that of Article 6, the
Court appears to have accepted the proposition that the three Arti-
cles reflected pre-existing or, at least emergent, rules of customary
international law in 1958.28 The minimum inference from the
majority opinion's relevant expressions in the Judgment is that
Articles 1-3 reflected emergent norms of customary law in 1958.29
Starting from that premise, it would be necessary to establish
whether or not State practice, including the practice of States whose
interest are especially affected, could be deemed sufficiently uni-
form and extensive since 1958 to constitute a general practice of
State conformity under a sense of legal obligation.30 Again, the
25. [1969] I.C.J. 39 para. 63 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 40 para. 66 (emphasis added).
27. One fairly obvious reason for the Court's failure to rule on this spe-
cific point was that such a declaration was unnecessary for resolution of the
issues presented by the Parties before the Court. The practice throughout
the Judgment was to go no further than was required to decide the case at hand.
28. It might be argued that the rules in Articles 1-3 did not attain what-
ever normative status they might have until the Convention entered into force
on 10 June 1964. But that conclusion is incompatible with the Court's reason-
ing; the inability to enter reservations to Articles 1-3 was created in 1958,
thereby taking cognizance of those Article's status at that time. It is unrea-
sonable to believe the Convention draftsmen would speculate about the State
practice which would come into existence between 1958 and the time the
treaty entered into force.
29. The Court further emphasized the customary law status of Articles
1-2 as originally formulated in the Continental Shelf Convention by declaring,
"... it is the Convention itself which would, for the reasons already indicated,
seem to deny to the provisions of Article 6 the same norm-creating character as,
for instance, Articles 1 and 2 possess." [1969] I.C.J. para. 71.
3Q. Id. para. 74, Paragraph 77 essentially reduce$ the customary law cri-
Vol. I
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Court did not comment directly on that issue.
The Court did, however, refer to the general legal regime
of the continental shelf in that "[t]his regime furnishes an ex-
ample of a legal theory derived from a particular source that has
secured a general following.""
The precise meaning of terms such as "general legal regime"
and "general following" was never made clear by the Court. Pre-
sumably, Articles 1-3 would be integral components in any gen-
eral regime, as State practice in the last decade has been pat-
terned, by and large, after those Articles.3 2  For example, the
very Parties before the Court apparently accepted the customary
law nature of Articles 1-3 and regarded them as the foundation
for the general doctrine of the continental shelf."a
Considering each Article in turn, it is difficult to believe
that the International Court of Justice would fail to affirm the
well-established customary legal status of the high seas and free
use of airspace over the continental shelf as these rules are ex-
pressed in Article 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 4 As
Article 2 was declared by the Court to "enshrine" the fundamen-
tal concept of the Continental Shelf, it would be highly contradic-
tory to find that Article 2 did not possess customary law status.3 5
teria to acts by States amounting to a "settled practice" under beliefs motivated
by a "sense of legal duty." Thus the standard of proof is more stringent when
the rule in question is not an emergent norm formulated in the Convention.
31. Id. at 53. The source mentioned in this context was the Truman
Proclamation of 28 September 1945. The Court regarded the Truman Proclama-
tion as the "starting point of the positive law" for the doctrine that the coastal
State has an "original, natural and exclusive" or "vested" right to the continental
shelf off its shores. Id. at 32-33.
32. The extent to which State practice has been independent of the influ-
ence of the Convention is difficult to state.
33. 1 Pleadings 61, 393, 402 (Federal Republic); Id. at 525; 2 Pleadings
92, 242 (Denmark and the Netherlands).
34. See the Preamble to the Convention on the High Seas. The claims
asserted by several Latin American States are an aberration from the customary
law of the high seas. Several major maritime powers, including the United
States and Russia, have officially protested against these assertions of sover-
eignty out to as far as 200 nautical miles.
35. [1969] I.C.J. 22 para. 19. It is, however, highly questionable whether
the definition of natural resources laid out in paragraph 4 of Article 2 could
have had more than "emerging norm" status in 1958. The late Dr. Chapman
reported,
The Fourth Committee dealt with the continental shelf, and fishery
questions looked initially as if they would be very disruptive to this
committee's work until the committee skillfully, if barely, got rid of them.
A resolution was put to the vote that included bottom fish, shrimp,
and so forth, as resources of the continental shelf. Had it passed the
10
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The scope of this inquiry can thus be narrowed to the trouble-
some definitional provisions contained in Article 1 of the Con-
tinental Shelf Convention.
The Court treated Article 1 as an entity and made no differ-
entiation between vague terms such as "[flor the purpose of
these articles . . .," "adjacent," "admits of the exploitation," or
".. . similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."
However, there is no compelling legal reason why the indefinite
meaning of these terms would necessarily preclude their being
crystallized into the customary law. Customary rules are in-
herently less precise (due to the nature of their formation) than are
the more explicit provisions spelled out in a convention. The
point is whatever the exact meaning of the terms in Article 1, the
Article itself would be eligible for adoption into the customary law,
if it were found to have a sufficient acceptance in State practice.36
In the North Sea Judgment the Court was presented with
conflicting opinions on Article l's legal effect. Professor Oda
urged in oral argument that Article 1 was definitional in purpose
and content with no independent normative function.37  But evi-
dence introduced by Denmark and the Netherlands revealed that
the Belgium Council of State believed Belgium's legal competence
to legislate for their continental shelf was based on the customary
law status of Articles 1 and 2.1' The Court was thus presented
with both sides of the question and could select a view from
between the alternatives offered regarding Article l's customary
committee would probably still be debating the issue. But it failed ...
The Committee then limited living resources of the continental shelf to
those permanently embedded in, or attached to, the bottom, or in
constant physical contact with the bottom during their harvestable
stage. The Law of the Sea, Third Annual Proceedings of the Law of
the Sea Institute (1968) 49-50.
36. This writer has chosen not to take an approach based on a factual
analysis of national practice to determine whether or not Article I should be
considered part of the general customary law. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to
note that approximately 107 nations have recognized the principle of the coastal
State's jurisdiction over adjacent offshore mineral resources. Most States and
territories have done so by domestic legislation, by agreement with other nations,
or by granting offshore concessions. See Hearings Before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Outer Continental Shelf of the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 61-65 (1970). See
also Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law,
41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66).
37. 2 Pleadings 197. There was apparently a difference of opinion
among the Federal Republic's representatives in this regard. See Id. Vol. I at 402.
38. 1 Pleadings 293-4. Belgium has since passed the legislation in
question.
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law status.
Possible enlightenment on the standpoint adopted in the
Judgment may be sought from President Bustamante Y Rivero
and from Judge Nervo, both of whom voted with the majority.
President Rivero apparently based the general concept of the con-
tinental shelf on both the Truman Proclamation and Articles 1
and 2 of the Geneva Convention. 9  Judge Nervo, in a separate
opinion, stated: "The first three articles of the Convention were
intended to be broadly declaratory of existing customary interna-
tional law .... -40 He went on to remark "[t]he right of a
coastal State to its continental shelf exists independently of the
express recognition thereof in the first three articles of the Con-
vention ... 41
From the expressions of President Rivero and Judge Nervo,
it seems fair to infer that Article 1 was, at a minimum, considered
compatible with the "general legal doctrine" of the continental
shelf which the Court stated to be part of customary international
law. Certainly the Court assumed that the parties had legally
justifiable rights to the disputed continental shelf areas all of which
were under 200 meters or the case could not have been enter-
tained in the first instance.4 2  It would be unreasonable to assume
that this exact figure of 200 meters which was cited by the Court
did not derive its genesis substantially from the figure formulated
in Article 1.13 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
other generating possibility, i.e., the Truman Proclamation, made
no specific mention of the 200 meter criterion.44
39. [1969] I.C.J. 59. President Rivero also stated, "... certain basic con-
cepts . . . the acceptance of which corresponds to a well-nigh universally held
opinion, or the sense of which necessarily flows from the very concept of the
continental shelf, are already sufficiently deeply anchored for such incorporation
[into general international law] to be possible." id.
40. Id. at 96.
41. Id. at 97. This refers to State practice outside the Convention which
was initiated by the Truman Proclamation.
42. See Id. at 13 where the North Sea is described in accordance with the
North Sea Policing of Fisheries Conventions of 6 May 1882 and note is made of
the fact that the sea-bed under consideration consisted of less than 200 meters.
43. There is no uniformity in scientific data which would require the
Court's acceptance of 200 meters as an exact depth to define the continental
shelf proper. The shelf edge does often appear to be close to the 200 meter
contour on standard oceanographic charts but the physical continental shelf varies
too much to expect geographers to satisfactorily resolve the definitional prob-
lems for legal purposes. See 4 Whiteman 814-842.
44. The 200 meter criterion was mentioned in an accompanying press
release.
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The logical and well-documented separate opinion by Judge
Ammoun of Lebanon is especially welcome in light of the uncer-
tainty in the majority opinion about the customary law status of
Article 1. Judge Ammoun began his analysis with the legal
context of the dispute. This entailed an examination of the ac-
tual concept of the continental shelf as it was the shelf's delimita-
tion which was in issue." Judge Ammoun pointed out that in
February 1969 only 39 States, out of a total of about 140 mak-
ing up the international community, had ratified the Convention,
and that these numbers alone would be insufficient to constitute a
general convention binding non-parties. 6
Turning his attention to customary law, he observed that
• . . the Convention on the High Seas mentions, in its pre-
amble, the intention of the parties to "codify the rules of inter-
national law relating to the high seas"; whereas the Convention
on the Continental Shelf says nothing of that kind. Further-
more, Article 1 of the latter Convention when giving a defini-
tion of the continental shelf, limits it to the purposes of the
articles of that Convention. It would not however be possible
to use these considerations as an argument for stating that the
concept of the continental shelf as opposed to that of the free-
dom of the high seas, is not yet accepted in customary interna-
tional law. Proof of the formation of custom is not to be de-
duced from statements in the text of a convention; it is in the
practice of States that it must be sought. 47
Judge Ammoun then carefully reviewed domestic and inter-
national acts by States which evinced an intent to accept the con-
cept of the continental shelf as formulated at the 1958 Geneva
Conference. 48  He deterimined that the aggregate body of ele-
ments amounted "now to a general consensus constituting an inter-
national custom sanctioning the concept of the continental shelf."49
But Judge Ammoun made further specific inquiry
...whether the delimitation of the continental shelf appear-
ing in Article 1 of the Convention has alone passed into cus-
tomary law, or whether the latter does not imply-as in the
case of historic waters--other outer limits of the area of the
high seas subjected to the jurisdiction of the coastal State un-
45. [1969] I.C.J. 101.
46. Id. at 102, 103. Kenya, Canada and Taiwan have since -ratified the
convention.
47. Id. at 103-104.
48. Id. at 104-106.
49. Id. at 106.
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der the title of continental shelf or of epicontinental platform,
or under some other denomination. 50
After discussing the basis of Latin American proclamations,
other recent claims, 51 and surveying numerous governments' po-
sitions as manifested at the Geneva Conference,52 Judge Ammoun
concluded that the epicontinental platform would have to be
added, when appropriate, to the area of the shelf. 53 More ex-
plicitly he stated,
. . . the situation is that the concept of the epicontinental plat-
form does not constitute a derogation from the definition of
the continental shelf in Article 1; the shelf and the platform are
not mutually exclusive; in the present stage of development of
law, they are called upon to supplement each other. . . .4
Several additional issues to which Judge Ammoun addresses
himself are also relevant to an understanding of Article 1. He
expressed the view that the use of the term "adjacent" in Article 1
was intended "to confine the continental shelf to a limited part of
the high seas, that part which prolongs the coast, to the exclusion
of the open sea." 55
The continental shelf was to be properly conceived as a nat-
ural submarine prolongation of territory-a "geological reality." 56
50. Id.
51. Italian-Yugoslav Agreement of 8 January 1968 and Saudi Arabia
claim to the Red Sea reported on 30 October 1968. Id. at 109-110.
52. Id. at 110-111.
53. Id. at 114. The epicontinental platform might include the continental
slope. It probably would not include the continental rise which geologically
occurs on oceanic, not continental crust. To some extent one's position would
depend upon how far down into the earth geological structures are considered
relevant.
54. Id. The following definitions are cited in 4 Whiteman 818:
Continental Shelf. The zone around a continent, extending from
the low-tide line to a depth at which there is a marked steepening of
slope to greater depths. Conventionally, its outer edge is taken at 100
fathoms (alternatively 200 meters) ["100 fathoms is exactly 600 ft. or
182.88 meters; 200 meters is exactly 109.36 fathoms"], but it may lie
between 20 and 300 fathoms (it is believed to average about 72 fathoms
or 132 meters).
Continental Slope. The declivity from the outer edge of the con-
tinental shelf into deeper water. (Its base is commonly between 2000
and 3000 fathoms.)
Also S. Whittemore Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, U.S. Department of
State, Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 240, 245 (1951).
55. [1969] I.C.J. 115. The term "adjacent" could be interpreted as a
qualification on depth as well as distance in restricting the potential application
of the "exploitability" clause in Article 1.
56. ld. at 117. The Court in general seemed to put more faith in
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However, a caveat was added in that a unity of legal regime was
not to be deduced from the unity of territory and of the continen-
tal shelf or platform. Judge Ammoun explained that there was no
extension of territorial sovereignty but simply a grant of those
sovereign or exclusive rights necessary for the exploration, exploi-
tation or protection of the resources of the continental shelf.57
These are, he declared, to be recognized as part of customary
international law. 58
Dissenting Opinions
Judge Tanaka, in a dissenting opinion to the North Sea Cases
enumerated and appraised the factors he considered important in
determining the speed of formulating customary international law
on the continental shelf. 59 First, he discussed the impetus given
to the formation of customary law by the consolidation and sys-
tematization of rules and principles in the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion.6" Secondly, he cited the positive influence of the fact that
the Geneva Convention owed its birth mainly to the "International
Law Commission composed of highly qualified internationally
well-known legal scholars representing the main legal systems of
the world in collaboration with a group of experts."' Thirdly,
he pointed out the urgent need to avoid international conflicts
because of the rapidly increasing economic necessity of exploit-
ing subsoil resources.62 Fourthly, he recognized that
the speedy tempo of present international life promoted by
highly developed communication and transportation had mini-
mized the importance of the time factor and has made possible
geology than is justified by the present knowledge. For instance, what State, if
any, might have the strongest "natural" claim to a new sedimentary basin dis-
covered in late 1969 on the Rockall Plateau in the North Atlantic? Great
Britain previously claimed the tiny Rockall Island, presumably with a view
towards establishing rights in the resources on its surrounding banks. But the
petroleum promising Rockall Plateau shoal area is separated from the continen-
tal shelf around Great Britain by the Rockall Trough, 2,700 meters deep. Ap-
parently the island continental shelf area in question "drifted" away with
Greenland from the European Continent. See Nature, Vol. 225, No. 5228, Jan-
uary 10, 1970 at 170-172.
57. [1969] I.C.J. 117-119. Judge Ammoun seems to be much clearer
on this point than is the majority opinion.
58. Id. at 120.
59. Id. at 176-179.
60. Id. at 176-177.
61. Id. at 177.
62. Id.
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the acceleration of the formation of customary international
law. What required a hundred years in former days now may
require less than ten years.8 3
Lastly, Judge Tanaka noted that the Continental Shelf Con-
vention facilitated the realization of customary law by providing
a legal system where a legal vacuum had existed.64
Judge Tanaka indicated that the required duration and uni-
formity of State practice varied according to the factors he men-
tioned. His unequivocal conclusion was that Articles 1-3 of the
Continental Shelf Convention were now part of the general corpus
of international law. 65
Other comments in dissenting opinions reinforced Judge Ta-
naka's view that Articles 1-3 specifically embodied part of the legal
doctrine of the continental shelf.6" By the Geneva Convention of
1958, the "continental shelf definitively acquired the status of a
legal institution"; that is, the fundamental concept of the conti-
nental shelf as represented by Articles 1-3 had been "established
as customary international law."'67 This was manifested by ac-
ceptance not only by those States which were parties to the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, "but also by those which have
subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or
have acquiesced in it when faced with legislative acts of other
States affecting them."68
Judge ad hoc Sorensen succinctly summarized the decisive
considerations as follows:
The adoption of the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf was a very significant element in the process of creating
new rules of international law in a field which urgently re-
quired legal regulation. The Convention has been ratified or
acceded to by a quite considerable number of States, and there
is no reason to believe that the flow of ratifications has ceased.
It is significant that the States which have become parties to
the Convention are fairly representative of all geographical reg-
ions of the world and of different economic and social systems.
Not only the contracting parties, but also other States, have
adapted their action and attitudes so as to conform to the Con-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 177-178.
65. Id. at 179.
66. Vice President Koretsky, Id. at 155-156.
67. Judge Tanaka, Id. at 173. See also Judge Morelli, Id. at 198.
68. Judge Lachs, Id. at 228-229.
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vention. No State which has exercised sovereign rights over
its continental shelf in conformity with the provisions of the
Convention has met with protests by other States.69
Professor Sorensen went on to state that the virtually uni-
form practice of States was sufficient evidence of the existence of
any necessary opinio juris.7° He concluded that "as a result of a
continuous process over a quarter of a century, the rules embodied
in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf have now at-
tained the status of generally accepted rules of international law."71
But Professor Sorensen added that the exploitability test for de-
termining outer limits cannot be reasonably understood "even in
its widest connotation, as extending far beyond the geological
concept." 2
CONCLUSION
The International Court of Justice clearly considered Arti-
cles 1-3 to be either pre-existing or emergent norms of customary
international law at the signing of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion. However, the majority opinion did not find it necessary for
resolution of the issues presented in the North Sea Judgment to
characterize individual terms in Articles 1-3 as either pre-existing
or emergent norms in 1958. Had such an endeavor been under-
taken, it seems likely from statements in the Judgment that the
Court would have found that Article 3 and paragraphs 1-3 of
Article 2 represented customary law at the time they were written
into the Convention. The Court probably also would have de-
clared that paragraph 4 of Article 2 and Article 1 were emergent
norms of customary law in 1958 primarily as a result of the codify-
ing force of the Convention and the immediate lack of State pro-
test to their early implementation in State practice.
The majority opinion in the Judgment stated that the "gen-
eral legal regime" of the continental shelf had secured a wide
following among States. From what can be learned from the in-
69. Id. at 246. Lack of official State protest may be due to the fact that
no State has relied upon the exploitability clause as a basis for an extensive
continental shelf claim.
70. Id. at 246-247.
71. Id. at 247. It is necessary to note that Judge ad hoc Sorensen did not
agree with the majority of the Court which treated Article 6 as severable from
Articles 1-3 in the Convention.
72. Id. at 249. It would have been quite helpful if the scope of the "geo-
logical concept" had been explained.
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dividual opinions of Judges who addressed themselves to the is-
sue, it emerges that Articles 1-3, as written, were considered inte-
gral parts of this "general legal regime" of the continental shelf
which was declared to have near uniform consensus and accept-
ance among States. There is no indication throughout the Cases
of any Judge, majority or dissenting, who would not have ac-
cepted the proposition that Articles 1-3, as presently exercised,
now constitute customary law.73 Some support for that conclusion
may be taken from the fact that at least four judges explicitly
stated that Articles 1-3 represented customary law even though a
direct ruling on that issue was not necessary for the decision the
Court had to reach.
The change in the attitude and practice of the Federal Re-
public of Germany illustrates some of the practical reasons for the
rapid assimilation of the multilateral treaty terms embodied in
Articles 1-3 into the general corpus of customary law. Recall that
at the 1958 conference on the law of the sea, the West Germans had
proposed that a coastal State had "no rights over the continental
shelf beyond the outer limits of its territorial sea."'74
Less than ten years later, the Federal Republic's position had
shifted to an express recognition of the customary law character
of Articles 1 and 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 75  A par-
tial explanation for the modified West German legal stance
must be attributed to the discovery in the intervening decade of
mineral deposits on their continental shelf. 76  To justify a claim
to these potential offshore petroleum reservoirs the Federal Re-
public was obligated in the North Sea Cases to support the prin-
ciple that the rights embodied in Articles 1 and 2 were sanc-
tioned by general customary law.77
73. It is essential to remember that when the Judgment was written there
were no perfected claims based on an expansive interpretation of the ex-
ploitability clause in Article 1.
74. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L.1 (memorandum concerning draft
Articles 67-73). The proposal was convincingly defeated.
75. 1 Pleadings 61, 393, 402.
76. West Germany is not a party to the Continental Shelf Convention.
However, apparently even Denmark and the Netherlands, which are Parties to
the Convention, accepted the customary law character of Articles 1-3. Id. at
525; 2 Pleadings 92, 242.
77. The forty-two Convention Parties are the following: Albania, Aus-
tralia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslova-
kia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel,
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
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Important consequences follow from States taking the view
that Articles 1-3 of the Continental Shelf Convention are part of
the general customary law. The forty-two Parties to the Conven-
tion now may be held to the treaty terms, both in a contractual and
in a customary sense. And, if one accepts the notion that inter-
national legislation can bind a dissenting or passive minority, non-
parties also would be obligated to comply with the customary
norms embodied in Articles 1-3. Thus States will have to care-
fully weigh the effects which newly negotiated treaties may have
on the presently accepted law of the continental shelf.7 8
Fortunately, the United States has introduced a Draft Con-
vention on the International Sea-Bed Area at an appropriate stage.
With no perfected claims by States based on the exploitability
clause in Article 1, there is still an opportunity for rational de-
velopment of a legal regime governing sea-bed areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction.7 9  But accelerating advances in marine tech-
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian
SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Eight
States which are not parties have incorporated the Article 1 definition into mu-
nicipal enactments: Argentina, Honduras, India, Italy, Morocco, United Arab
Republic, Uruguay and West Germany.
Three States have adopted only the exploitability criterion of Article 1: Bra-
zil, Norway, and Philippines. Fourteen States have chosen other definitions than
those in Article 1: Chile, Costa Rica, Dahomey, East Germany, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Ghana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama, Pakistan, Peru and
South Korea. Twenty-three States have, in addition, proclaimed or legislated
without indicating a position on the definition of continental shelf in Article 1.
Nineteen more States or territories have granted offshore concessions in apparent
absence of any general enactments. Czechoslovakia, Malawi, Switzerland and
Uganda have ratified the Continental Shelf Convention, but most of the remain-
ing twenty-five landlocked States have taken no official action. Interestingly, Tai-
wan ratified with a reservation to Article 6 favoring the "natural prolongation"
theory.
78. Multilateral treaty provisions may modify customary norms after a suf-
ficient number of States satisfactorily demonstrate a preference for the conven-
tional term in lieu of the customary norm. But mere denunciation of a conven-
tion term which is part of the customary law would not necessarily absolve a
State from its obligation to observe the rules of customary international law,
proof of the existence of which is to be found in the treaty. However, the im-
pact of the convention as evidence of custom would be proportionately reduced
by the defection of the former party.
79. See Goldie, The Exploitability Test: Interpretation and Potentialities,
8 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 434 (1968). The most comprehensive and
scholarly general study of Article l's travaux preparatoires, is found in Oxman,
The Preparation of Article I of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Clear-
inghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, PB 182100. See also
U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/19 entitled, A Discussion of the Legislative History and
Possible Construction of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
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nology indicate that time for State inaction may be rapidly run-
ning out."' If progress is to be made toward an early sea-bed con-
ference, States should recognize that agreement will be enhanced
by beginning negotiating efforts on the basis of Convention rules
which are compatible with presently accepted State practice. More
extravagant or intransigent positions by States adopting a short
term view will cause further delays and will undoubtedly result
in a proliferation of unilateral pronouncements extending the sea-
ward jurisdictional reach of coastal states. 81 The disruptive effects
on the settled law and the potential for precipitating armed con-
frontations make it imperative that the existing consensus be ap-
preciated and a law of the sea conference promptly convened on
that basis.
80. The United States leads the world in the development of marine sci-
ence techniques. Thus the proposed Draft Convention on the International
Sea-Bed Area seems particularly magnanimous as the Americans probably could
benefit greatly from unregulated exploitation of the deep sea-bed.
81. The concern for this trend is indicated in U.N. Res. 2574 (Dec. 15,
1969) which solicited member States views on the desirability of an early law
of the sea conference, particularly to define the limits of national jurisdiction
over the sea-bed; requested further Secretariat study on international control ma-
chinery; and declared that pending establishment of an international regime,
"States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activi-
ties of exploitation . . . beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
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